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Abstract 
For years, the aviation industry has been under severe scrutiny over the safety of flight 
when cockpit automation is over relied on and when it is under utilized. This double-edged 
sword raises the question of situation awareness in aviation. With the recent boom in cockpit 
automation and advanced avionics some fear that the pilots are being put outside "the loop". 
Unfortunately, humans are notoriously poor monitors of reliable systems over time. However, 
research is currently being conducted into a new form of display that has the ability to group a 
myriad of aircraft mission and system status information onto one display, thereby providing 
pilots with a clear and concise view of the "big" picture, in one glance. This display utilizes a 
regular geometric shape generated on a polar graphic plot to indicate whether all monitored 
parameters are within acceptable limits. Dubbed Mission Status Graphics, the regular geometric 
shape will warp to a non-symmetrical form indicating that a mission or system parameter has 
exceeded its normal operating range. NASA Langley Research Center is currently investigating 
this display system for application to commercial aircraft cockpits; however, it is believed that 
general aviation flight safety and pilot situation awareness could also benefit from the addition of 
this display in future cockpit designs. 
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1.0-Introduction 
When given the task of monitoring reliable systems, humans perform poorly, especially 
over long periods of time (Mackworth, 1950). Aviation systems are becoming increasingly more 
automated, causing the role of a pilot on the modern flight deck to transform from operator to 
supervisor. As a result it has become necessary to find a method of conveying information so 
that even the least vigilant monitors can notice critical deviations of systems and mission 
parameters in a timely manner (Trujillo, 2002). The ability of an aircrew to generate an accurate 
internalized picture of the current state of their aircraft's mission and system performance is 
essential in order to achieve an overall high level of situation awareness (SA). Since one of the 
primary responsibilities of the modern aircrew is to develop SA and maintain it in a rapidly 
changing environment, it is crucial that they be capable of seeing the "big" picture"(Trujillo & 
Schutte, 1999). However, it is challenging to piece together the true state of the aircraft, at a 
given moment, due to the complexity and quantity of factors that must be taken into account. A 
pilot's ability to achieve a working understanding of the current state of their aircraft and the 
subsequent ability to predict the future state of the aircraft, in the short term, is indicative of the 
overall level of SA they are capable of reaching. Everyday, thousands of pilots are being forced 
to perform monitoring tasks for which both the aircraft and man are ill equipped. To aid in this 
effort, technology will need to be effectively employed in a manner consistent with human 
factors design. The next generation of aircraft cockpits will need to have the operator interface 
optimized for maximum human performance through the use of advanced avionics packages that 
can incorporate critical information in to a more usable dynamic interface then those currently 
seen in the aviation industry. 
Perhaps polar-star displays, like those under development at NASA, will provide some of 
the much needed situation awareness enhancement on the modern flight deck. Polar star 
displays consist of a regular polygon generated on a polar graphic coordinate plot. Each vertex 
of the polygon represents a significant variable being monitored for fluctuation beyond 
acceptable ranges. When all variables are reading normal, the polygon will be symmetric and 
each vertex will lie on a circle. Conversely, when one or more variables are abnormal the 
polygon will transform into an obviously asymmetric shape. The figure below (Figure la) shows 
a polar star display with all variables normal and another (Figure lb) with two variables 
abnormal. The polar star display format was originally developed for nuclear power plant 
Figure 1 - Example polar star displays: all variables normal (a) and two variables abnormal (b) 
control rooms however, NASA Langley recently took another look at polar star displays and 
their potential for application to the dynamic modern aircraft flight deck environment. In what 
they are calling mission status graphics (MSG), NASA's next generation polar star displays have 
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the ability to logically group critical flight parameters onto one display, that currently are 
inconsistently scattered across the multitude of commercial and general aviation instrument 
panels in use in the aviation industry today. However, in order to understand the impact of polar 
star displays in aviation an overview of situation awareness factors needs to be examined. It 
needs to be emphasized that this area has not been well investigated and that the research 
proposed below is the first step toward understanding the benefits that the MSG polar star 
displays can provide in the fight to improve situation awareness in the cockpit. 
LI Foundations of Situation Awareness and the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 
Endsley (1988), formally defines situation awareness as, "the perception of the elements 
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future." Within this definition, Endsley alludes to the 
three distinct levels of SA. Level 1 SA involves the perception of the relevant elements in the 
environment. The second level of SA is based on the synthesis of the disjointed Level 1 
elements into a seamless comprehension of the current situation (Level 2 SA). Finally, the 
ability to project the future actions of the elements in the environment, in the short term, is what 
forms the third and highest level of situation awareness (Level 3 SA). 
Situation awareness is not new. In fact, it has always been needed in order for people to 
perform t asks e ffectively and accurately. H owever, a s t ime p assed, t he p hysical t asks o f o Id 
were replaced by more elaborate perceptual and cognitive tasks. With the coming of the machine 
age, emphasis shifted towards creating a new class of tools to help people perform tasks, 
primarily of a physical nature, more easily. The computer age and the information age quickly 
followed the machine age and the tools created by engineers suddenly became more complex, 
shifting focus from physical tasks that dominated the machine age to more elaborate perceptual 
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and cognitive tasks associated with the ever growing dependence on computer interfaces. 
Unfortunately, when confronted with large quantities of data, supplied by the computers that 
have become a part of everyday life, many operators may be even less informed then ever before, 
lending support to Endsley's (2000) claim of an ever widening "information gap" between 
advanced systems and those humans sitting at the controls. Today's aircraft pilots, air traffic 
controllers, and power plant operators must perceive and comprehend a dazzling and bewildering 
array of dynamic data that, by definition, is always changing. Therefore, in today's complex 
environments, such as the modern flight deck, situation awareness must be maximized in order to 
ensure errors are minimized (Endsley, 2000). With the promise of even more technology in the 
future capable of generating an onslaught of information at speeds that exceed human 
capabilities, it is important that designers employ cognitive engineering principles in their effort 
to combat man's shortcomings as part of these advanced systems. 
In the aviation domain, specifically on the flight deck of modern transport aircraft, the 
perception of cues, Level 1 SA, is fundamental. Pilots must be aware of critical elements such as 
terrain, other aircraft, warning lights, navigational data, and system status, along with their 
relevant characteristics. The likelihood of forming an incorrect internal mental image of the 
current state of the environment is dramatically escalated without a basic perception of the 
mission and system critical information. In fact, Jones and Endsley (1996) found that 76% of 
situation awareness errors in pilots could be traced to problems in perception of the needed 
information due to either failures or shortcomings in the way systems convey pertinent 
information or problems with the necessary cognitive process. 
Level 2 of situation awareness can only be achieved once the perceptual process of Level 
1 SA has taken place. With Level 2 SA, a working understanding of the significance, in light of 
ones goals becomes apparent to the monitors. For example, during the cruise portion of a flight, 
4 
if a catastrophic failure of an onboard system occurs it will be conveyed via visible and audible 
warnings. The pilots must quickly take the holistic picture of the environment formed in Level 1 
SA and come to a determination with regards to the airworthiness of the aircraft (Endsley, 2000). 
According to Flach (1995), a person with Level 2 SA is one that is able to derive operationally 
relevant meaning and significance from the Level 1 data perceived. The previous example 
illustrates this transition from Level 1 SA to Level 2 SA as the decision process to determine 
whether an emergency divert is warranted. Put more simply, Level 2 SA is analogous to having 
a high level of reading comprehension as compared to just being able to read words (Level 1 SA) 
(Endsley, 2000). In Jones and Endsley's (1995) research, 20% of situation awareness errors in 
pilots were found to involve problems with Level 2 SA. This may be as a result of the sheer 
quantity of variables that must be assimilated and digested in order to form a correct internalized 
view of the "big" picture. 
Most experienced pilots tend to spend a significant amount of their time anticipating 
possible future occurrences thereby maximizing time and knowledge necessary to decide on the 
most favorable course of action to meet their objectives. The ability to execute this dynamic 
cognitive process is what separates Level 2 S A from Level 3 SA. The mark of a skilled expert, 
according to Endsley (2000), is one who can visualize, maintain, and rely on, future projections 
of their environment. Since Level 3 SA is the most difficult for pilots to achieve, only 3.4% of 
situation awareness errors can be attributed to problems with its highest level, according to Jones 
and Endsley (1995). Of the 3.4% of Level 3 errors, most can be attributed to the over projection 
of current trends into fictitious emergencies thereby resulting in prudent yet unnecessary actions. 
However, the relationship between performance and situation awareness can be a 
problematic link. Good SA should increase the probability of good decisions and good 
performance but it is not necessarily guaranteed. Therefore, measuring SA can be complicated. 
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When measuring situation awareness subjectively, numerical values are typically 
assigned to the quality of SA during a particular period or event. Unlike other types of SA 
metrics, subjective estimations can be collected in controlled real world settings. Furthermore, 
subjective measures offer the ability to accurately gauge situation awareness during the 
evaluation of design concepts in simulator studies that mimic real world settings (Endsley & 
Garland, 2000). 
One such subjective measure of SA is the Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
(SART). This self-rating scale is one of the best known and most thoroughly tested subjective 
techniques for measuring situation awareness. When using SART, one must assume that the 
operators used some understanding of situations in making decisions, that this understanding is 
available to consciousness, and that it can be readily made explicit and quantifiable when asked 
(Gawron, 2000). 
In order to develop scales appropriate for this SA measurement process, knowledge 
elicitation techniques were utilized to determine which elements an aircrew considered to be 
essential for good SA. From these interviews, ten generic SA constructs emerged that could be 
clustered into three broad domains. The attentional demand domain is composed of following 
constructs: instability of situation, variability of situation, and complexity of situation. The 
second domain, attentional supply, is composed of arousal, spare mental capacity, concentration, 
and division of attention. Understanding, the third and final domain, incorporates information 
quantity, information quality, and familiarity (Endsley and Garland, 2000). From these 
constructs two types of SART were developed. For in-depth subjective ratings a ten dimensional 
method is preferred where subjects are asked to indicate on a continuous scale their ratings in 
response to each of the ten constructs listed above, for a given situation. However, the 
combination of the three broad domains make up an abbreviated and easily applied three 
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dimensional SART scale that can be used when task complexity and the degree of intrusiveness 
permitted by the measured tasks is minimal, making a shorter scale advantageous. When using a 
3-D SART, the subjects will indicate their ratings for the three domains on a continuous 100-
millimeter line from low (0 mm) to high (100 mm). In the end, the ratings on the 3-D SART can 
be combined to create a single value for subjective SA by employing the following formula 
derived from theoretical considerations of how the three domains interact: SA (calc) = 
Understanding - (Demand - Supply). For the proposed mission status graphics research, a 3-D 
SART is preferred due to its unique advantages over other subjective techniques beyond the 
inherent advantages of subjective measures in general. One advantage of SART is its high level 
of ecological validity due to the fact that its dimensions were procured directly from operational 
aircrew. Second, the constructs are general in nature and therefore have the potential to be 
applied to non-aircrew domains thereby further bolstering validity. And finally, SART data 
lends itself to easy interpretation when correlated with performance measures. Furthermore, 
SART is simple to implement, easy to administer, economical, and non-intrusive, when 
employed in either real world or simulated environments (Endsley & Garland, 2000). However, 
SART does have limitations as well. The confounding process of having operators rate their 
own SA without knowing what they don't know or what errors may be present in their internal 
representations of the situation; the possible influence of their performance on their ratings; and 
the intermingling of the supply and demand on attention metrics with workload measurement 
techniques, all serve as potential limitations to the SART method (Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & 
Croft, 1998). In light of the pros and cons, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 
will be used to quantify experimental data on situation awareness for the proposed experiment 
outlined below. In addition, accuracy questions will be combined with the 3-D SART to qualify 
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the subjective questionnaire and insure that the participants truly do understand the information 
presented to them. 
Looking beyond the accepted definitions and approved measurement methods, 
fundamentally good situation awareness in the cockpit depends on a pilot's ability to possess and 
process specific categories of geographical, spatial, system, environmental, and tactical data. 
This data constitute the five general classes of elements needed for SA; the substructure for the 
definition and the three distinct levels of SA described above. 
1.2 — The Basic Elements of Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness, on the modern flight deck, involves identifying what things the 
aircrew needs to perceive, understand, and project into the future. In general, across many types 
of aircraft systems, the five general classes of elements are needed in order for situation 
awareness to be present (Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999). The first class of SA elements 
required is geographical situation awareness. Geographical SA refers to the location of the 
aircraft, other aircraft in the vicinity, pertinent terrain features that may impact the flight path, 
navigational way points including the desired path to destination, climb and descent points, as 
well as, taxiway and runway arrangements when on the ground. The second class of required 
elements for good aviation SA is spatial/temporal situation awareness. This class includes 
variables like altitude, heading, attitude, velocity, flight path, and clearances, combined with 
aircraft specific performance capabilities. System SA is the third class of situation awareness 
elements that must be present for a correct visualization of the flight deck environment to be 
possible. System SA includes system status, functioning, and settings; air traffic control 
communications; flight modes and automation entries; the impact of malfunctions and system 
degradation on flight safety; in addition to fuel constraints. Weather formations, icing, ceilings, 
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temperatures, clouds, fog, sun, visibility, turbulence, winds, IFR and VFR conditions and 
requirements, and overall flight safety combine to make up environmental SA, the fourth class of 
situation awareness elements required for an overall high level of situation awareness. The fifth 
and final class of situation awareness elements, critical to the formation of a correct composite 
SA model, i s tactical situation awareness. T actical S A includes identification, tactical status, 
type, capabilities, location and flight dynamics of other aircraft; the aircraft's capabilities in 
relation to other aircraft; and threat detection, prioritization, and projection (Garland, Wise, & 
Hopkin, 1999). However, it is important to remember that each of the classes of SA elements 
previously mentioned may not directly map on to Endsley's three levels of situation awareness 
for all human senses (i.e. aural SA, tactile SA, etc) because a pilot's tasks are primarily visual. 
Mission status graphics polar star displays, the focus of this study, are designed to 
logically group the most pertinent flight parameters critical to spatial and system SA into a one-
glance display. Of the elements mentioned previously, MSG will monitor and display 
information about onboard systems status (e.g. electrical, hydraulic) and mission status (e.g. 
altitude, fuel). Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that MSG will facilitate a more rapid 
perception of cues (Level 1 S A) and a more accurate working understanding of the significance 
of the perceived elements (Level 2 SA) with respect to the spatial and system parameters it was 
designed to convey. That is to say, the mission status graphics display, in its current form, is not 
intended to enhance all five elements of SA described previously but is designed to address 
spatial and system situation awareness shortfalls that currently plague commercial and general 
aviation. Also, it is important to note that neither mission status graphics nor polar star displays 
have been investigated to determine their exact impact on situation awareness thereby creating a 
need for the research proposed in this paper. 
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In addition to the basic elements of SA, there are several cognitive factors that can 
influence situation awareness in both negative and positive ways that must also be considered 
when designing and testing the next generation of cockpit automation. 
1.3 - Cognitive Factors that can Influence Situation Awareness 
The modern cockpit poses several challenges to even the most diligent flight crews. 
Human attention capacity, one of the factors that can influence SA and measured directly in 
SART, can be and often is strained by information overload, task complexity, and the requisite 
multi tasking that comes as part of the complex and dynamic aviation environment (Endsley, 
2000). Over time, situation awareness may suffer due to the allocation of attention to compelling 
information drawing it away from less striking information that may be of equal or greater 
importance. The lack of SA that occurs as a result can lead to poor decision-making that 
ultimately is the underlying cause of human error. 
Perhaps this is one area where the superior capabilities of polar star displays to portray 
critical parameters more saliently then traditional methods will benefit SA. The asymmetric 
polygon indicating one or more parameter is out of bounds, vertices that change color to indicate 
problem severity, and the normal operating range reference circle, all "pop-out" out of the visual 
scene to create emergent features that lead to pre-attentive visual processing (Pomerantz & 
Pristach, 1989). Furthermore, the simplicity and the clarity of the uncluttered polar star display 
format supports rapid information transfer to the pilot; in one glance, the critical mission and 
system parameters can be viewed speeding up the perceptual process of Level 1 SA. Achieving 
a working understanding of the perceived elements (Level 2 SA) can then be rapidly 
accomplished by comparing each vertex to the reference circle. This allows the pilot to spend 
10 
more time anticipating possible future problems, leaving more decision time to arrive at the most 
favorable course of action and final result (Level 3 SA). 
Poor SA resulting from attention problems in acquiring data, as evidenced by Endsley's 
(1995) review of NTSB accident reports that showed that 31% of accidents involving human 
error were due to this factor. In order to avoid such errors, pilots typically employ a process of 
information sampling to bypass attention limits, according to Endsley (1995). This allows them 
to attend to information in a rapid sequence following a predetermined pattern stored in long-
term memory with consideration given to the relative priority of the data and the frequency with 
which the data changes. However, humans do not always optimally sample the information 
presented before them, demonstrating a need for a display like MSG that logically groups critical 
parameters on one display thereby greatly reducing the size of a pilots scan pattern and the time 
required for information sampling. Furthermore, the ever-present problem of information 
overload can also lead the pilots to alter their normal sampling pattern causing them to allocate 
too much attention to one or more elements while neglecting the other elements in the 
environment that may be of equal or greater importance. In order to overcome attention 
problems and correctly know which information to focus on and which information can be 
ignored, the pilot(s) must have, at some level, an understanding about all of the data as a whole, 
that is to say they must possess the "big" picture (Endsley, 2000). In addition, the speed and 
accuracy with which information is perceived during Level 1 situation awareness can be affected 
by the contents of both working memory and long-term memory through the presence of 
preexisting knowledge of the location of specific information, the form which the information 
takes, and the element specific characteristics of the information (Davis, Kramer, & Graham, 
1983). With mission status graphics, the contents of working and long-term memory would be 
reduced since the location of specific information, the form it takes, and its characteristics would 
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be the same across many of the critical flight parameters thereby shrinking the scan pattern, 
reducing the time needed to view elements, and overall improving the accuracy of the perceptual 
process. 
Another limiting cognitive factor affecting situation awareness is working memory. 
Level 2 SA requires that a pilot must combine new data with existing knowledge in working 
memory to successfully paint a composite mental picture of the current state of his or her 
aircraft. According to Miller (1956), the human working memory is capable of maintaining a 
"magic number 7 plus or minus 2" chunks of information, at one time. Millers' analysis implies 
that most or all limits on mental processes can be attributed to a single source. Functionally, 
working memory is where all cognitive operations receive their data and produce outputs or 
responses. Furthermore, working memory allows a pilot to retain relevant information like 
airspeed, altitude, heading, and tail-number, for tactical operations. In addition, working 
memory relies heavily on long-term memory for the cognitive tasks of information organization, 
decision-making, and problem solving. Time dependant processes like attention capacity and 
forgetting all serve as limitations to working memory. Therefore, working memory clearly 
permeates every aspect of a pilot's ability to assimilate and process information. Subsequently, 
achieving Level 2 SA in such environments can often tax an already overloaded working 
memory, thereby stretching a pilot's attention capacity leaving fewer resources to direct toward 
the process of acquiring new data that may be occurring simultaneously. Reaching Level 3 SA 
similarly affects working memory because forecasting future status and predicting the 
appropriate course of action to take will burden working memory as well (Endsley, 1996). The 
prediction of future states imposes a strong load on working memory by requiring the 
maintenance of current conditions, future conditions, and the actions appropriate to address the 
predicted future conditions, according to Wickens (1984). Therefore, it becomes clear that this 
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heavy and highly undesirable load that the working memory is forced to endure, especially in the 
higher levels of situation awareness, can seriously impact the formulation and selection of 
responses in addition to hindering simultaneous and subsequent actions or decisions. 
Just as overload in working memory can lead to decrements in situation awareness, the 
type of information displayed and the manner in which it's conveyed can also affect overall 
situation awareness. 
1.4 - The Role of Mental Processing and Mechanisms in the Formation of Situation Awareness 
When presented and asked to process dynamic and complex information people may 
switch between data-driven and goal-driven processing. With a data-driven or bottom-up 
processing, a variety of environmental features are detected and their inherent properties are used 
to determine which information will receive further focalized attention and processing (Endsley, 
2000). Cue salience plays an important role in this process and to situation awareness as a 
whole, by impacting which segments of the environment receive attention. When people 
function in a goal-driven or top-down fashion, SA can be influenced by the operator's goals and 
expectations, which in turn can have a direct influence on how attention is directed, how data are 
perceived, and eventually how the data are interpreted. In the cockpit, an aircrew's goals and 
plans primarily direct their attention to the mission critical parameters that must be integrated, 
interpreted, and acted upon, in light of these goals, to form and maintain level 2 SA. However, it 
is possible to observe the interchange between top-down and bottom-up processing, allowing the 
pilots to process large quantities of information dynamically in the cockpit. The ability of an 
aircrew to juggle multiple competing goals effectively comes with experience and maintaining 
these goals has been associated with distributed attention, critical in the aviation domain where 
human performance has a direct effect on safety (Endsley, 2000). 
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Yet another manner in which situation awareness can be affected is through automaticity in 
processing information. Automaticity, a characteristic of cognitive processing in which practiced 
consistent behaviors are performed rapidly, with minimal effort, and with automatic allocation of 
attention to the processing of the stimulus, has its advantages and disadvantages. It is often 
useful in overcoming attention limitations but can simultaneously leave the pilots susceptible to 
missing novel stimuli that may impact the safety of flight (i.e. system or mission parameter 
deviations) (Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999). In complex environments, like the modern flight 
deck, it is easy for actions to become habitual over time, demanding less attention then required. 
When the stimulus changes ever so slightly it is possible for the pilots to miss it and carry out the 
habitual action. Automaticity can impact every aspect of a flight from air traffic control 
clearances, altitude changes, system performance properties, etc. As time goes by and pilot 
experience increases, automatic processes tend to be fast, autonomous, effortless, and can occur 
without conscious awareness or attention (Logan, 1988). However, automatic processing, for the 
most part, is advantageous in that it provides reliable performance with minimal attention 
allocation even though it may foster an increased risk by making highly experienced pilots less 
responsive to new stimuli because automatic processes operate with limited use of feedback. 
Maintaining a high level of situation awareness when using automatic processing is crucial in 
order to avoid non-typical situations that may decrease decision-making timelines and overall 
decision effectiveness (Endsley, 2000). 
By providing pilots with a polar star display like mission status graphics, it may be 
possible to reduce the transitions pilots must perform between goal-driven and data-driven 
processing required by them to maintain situation awareness in a dynamic and information rich 
environment. Such a reduction could translate directly into performance improvements like a 
decrease in failure detection time, while improving the reliability of automaticity by fostering a 
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more accurate and complete understanding of the "big" picture in the minds of the pilots sitting 
at the controls. 
Engineers and designers of the next generation of cockpit avionics and automation have a 
daunting responsibility to improve situation awareness on the modern flight deck. Careful 
consideration must be given to human factors when determining ways to: effectively deliver 
critical cues, ensure and safeguard expectation of accuracy; develop systems for assisting pilots 
in deploying attention efficiently; develop methods for preventing the disruption of attention 
especially during non-normal events with high workload and stress factors; and to develop 
systems that are compatible in achieving the aircrew's goals. Each new piece of technology 
provides a potential advantage for delivering new information, more accurate information, new 
ways of providing or displaying information, or the reduction of crew workload (Endsley, 1996). 
However, that is not to say that each new system may not also affect SA in unpredicted and 
possibly negative ways. Innumerable factors surrounding the implementation and integration of 
new technology and design concepts may act to degrade situation awareness. To prevent adverse 
affects from future automation, significant care must be taken to evaluate the impact of proposed 
systems on the overall situation awareness of its operators. It is only through thorough testing 
and carefully controlled studies that the actual significance of new technology can be ascertained 
(Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999). 
Aircraft are evolving with every new breakthrough in technology. More systems are 
being added which implies that more parameters will need to be monitored by the pilots in their 
quest to achieve and maintain high levels of situation awareness. Since instrument panel space is 
limited, and may become even smaller in the next few decades due to aerodynamic constraints, 
simply adding more digital representation of analog "steam-gauge" style displays will not be an 
option. One possible way to employ technology to improve situation awareness on the modern 
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flight deck is to use polar-star displays that will show deviations from normal in a more salient 
manner by employing a polygon's vertices to report pertinent mission and systems values. 
2.0 - Background and Theory of Polar Star Displays and Mission Status Graphics 
2.1- Polar Star Displays 
The notion of displaying critical parameters via a polar graphic plot has been around for 
decades. First employed in the domain of nuclear power plants, in 1981, Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation, under contract with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), investigated a 
new format for displaying various nuclear power plant safety parameters that involved 
employing what they called an "Iconic Polargraphic Safety Parameter Display System" that uses 
the points of a polygon on a polar graph plot to depict system status. 
After the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania during 
March 1979, an assortment of investigations revealed significant deficiencies in the area of man-
machine interface design. More specifically, the preexisting methods of data display failed to 
present a concise picture of the overall safety state of the power plant to the operators. In 
response to the events at Three Mile Island a variety of safety parameter display systems (SPDS) 
were researched and designed with the overall goal of conveying the safety state of the power 
plant in a concise and timely manner in order to enhance detection and assessment of potential 
threats that may compromise safety (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). From the wide range of 
proposed SPDS prototypes, Westinghouse chose two concepts for the EPRI study. 
The first SPDS, deemed Safety Panel A, brought together several key variables grouped 
according to five major safety functions: primary coolant inventory, core heat removal, 
secondary heat removal, reactivity control, and radioactive containment integrity. The 
aforementioned variables were displayed as a thirty minute trend using a standard Cartesian 
graph format, plotted on a logarithmic scale to p rovide operators with w ide range indications 
about overall plant status (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). 
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The second SPDS, Safety Panel B, used an iconic polar star display format to present a 
comprehensive summary of plant health. The display took on the form of an octagon with each 
of the eight spokes in the figure representing the scale for a particular safety parameter. Normal 
conditions were plotted on the polar graph as fixed points equidistant from the center of the plot. 
The resulting regular geometric pattern created a frame of reference from which to judge 
abnormal conditions. Parameters with increasing magnitudes were plotted as points further away 
from the center of the figure while parameters with decreasing magnitudes were potted as points 
closer to the center of the plot. Furthermore, the reference parameters were dynamically scaled 
as a function of operational mode of the power plant so that the reference figure was always 
perfectly octagonal. Therefore, abnormal conditions would result in an irregular geometric 
pattern that clearly would deviate from the reference octagon (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). 
Westinghouse went on to conduct an experiment at a nuclear power plant simulator 
designed primarily for operator training. In addition, the experiment was created to mesh the 
study with a previously scheduled regular training session for a four-loop pressurized water-
cooled reactor in both normal and non-normal states. Eight crews of three experienced, licensed 
operators per crew, at the simulator for a routine five-day refresher course, served as subjects for 
the Westinghouse experiment. Each crew, according to the experimental design, experienced all 
sixteen abnormal reactor events that consisted of both diagnostic problems and multiple failure 
events. Four of the crews were run through the sixteen scenarios with only the existing control 
panel whereas the remaining four crews experienced the scenarios with one of the SPDS 
prototypes added to the standard control room. Only one SPDS was available per crew and 
experimental control was achieved through counterbalancing transients and SPDS prototypes 
across crews (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). 
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Data was collected from two sources by the researchers. The first source was a computer 
record of all control actions and process parameter values during each event. The second source 
of data collected during the experiment was from observation of crew behavior from video and 
audio recordings of each event. Woods, Wise, and Hanes' (1981) cumulative, untraditional, 
three-fold data analysis focused on how the prototype SPDS aided operator performance. First, 
event timelines were produced for each scenario that crews encountered, based on the computer 
records and video/audio of each of the events. By mixing together these data sources a record of 
each data collection run was created that correlated plant state, operator problem solving 
behavior, and operator actions. Second, decision charts that captured the links between decision 
and operator actions (e.g. crew strategy) were compiled to highlight the cumulative decision 
making process for each event. The third part of the data analysis process was to separate 
categories of key decisions and identify patterns of SPDS usage as a function of the 
predetermined decision categories (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). 
The authors stated that the decision analysis approach helped achieve the experimental 
goals of this nuclear power plant control room evaluation, according to the researchers, by 
helping t o a ssess h ow t he S PDS p rototypes i nfluenced o perator b ehavior. " In t he d omain o f 
nuclear power plant operation, it is not enough to know what the operator did, it's also important 
to understand the decision/action context so future training modules can be modified 
appropriately to reflect what was learned in this study." according to Woods, Wise, and Hanes 
(1981). By knowing the decision context, operator actions were aggregated into decision/action 
paths thereby allowing the researchers to evaluate the SPDS in terms of the role the addition 
played in the evolution of the decision paths. This was a critical clue to the researchers in their 
efforts to refine the decision making process that nuclear power plant operators undertake when 
troubleshooting problems (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). 
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The results of the Westinghouse decision analysis study found no clear quantitative or 
qualitative benefits with one SPDS over the other. In other words Safety Panel A did not do any 
better than Safety Panel B, and vice-versa, but the results of the decision analysis did suggested 
that in the test situations where an SPDS was used the crew was able to return the plant to a safe 
configuration sooner and with fewer parameter excursions than in situations when the SPDS was 
either not available or not utilized. However, a complete safety panel effectiveness evaluation 
based on plant state was not performed because some crews either chose not to use the panel or 
were unsuccessful accessing the safety panel. During the experiment, the safety panels -
relatively unfamiliar tools, attempted to compete with a very familiar tool - the standard control 
board instrumentation. As experimenters expected, the SPDS were not used at times when it 
could have provided useful data to the operators. Primarily, the person acting as shift supervisor 
tended to access the safety display panels more frequently then the other two support crew 
members (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). A multitude of factors such as display placement, 
display access, crew training, standard control room procedures, and individual crew differences 
had an impact on the usage, or lack thereof, of the SBDS prototypes. The researchers went on to 
say that SPDS usage might have been higher had the panel been located more centrally. 
However, the researchers did not state how they arrived at these conclusions. 
Overall, according to Woods, Wise, & Hanes, (1981), the Westinghouse experiment 
achieved its major objectives. The experimenters stated that the analysis of key decisions made 
by the crews while responding to simulated plant accidents provided important insights about 
nuclear power plant crew performance in the domains of crew decision behavior, safety panel 
usage, decision analysis, and the use of a training simulator as a research tool. Furthermore, 
crew decision behavior was found to be based on a bottom-up, or data-driven, view of the control 
room panel. Safety panel usage occurred successfully on most trials, as demonstrated by the fact 
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that the shift supervisor frequently accessed the safety panel, with numerous recorded instances 
where reference to the SPDS aided in problem recognition and plant control tasks but were little 
or no help with crew decision planning. "The decision analysis method developed and applied in 
this research proved to be a very useful tool for identifying crew decisions and actions," 
according to Woods, Wise, and Hanes (1981). In addition, it provided a context for the 
researchers that helped them understand the basis for their decisions and actions along an event 
timeline. Finally, according to the research, it became clear that a training simulator could be 
used during normal training as an effective tool for evaluating potential control room 
modifications such as the Safety Parameter Display Systems in their experiment. The 
experimenters went on to state that the limited use of the SPDS was as a result of: variations in 
crew styles, differences among crew response strategies, the small number of operator 
difficulties, the amount of wide variation of safety panel usage, the small sample of crews, the 
difficulties o f d efining meaningful p erformance m easures, a nd t he 1 imitations i mposed b y t he 
retraining program in which the experiment had to be incorporated (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 
1981). 
This research clearly indicates that integrated information displays, like safety parameter 
displays s ystems, h ave t he p otential t o e nhance situation a wareness i n c omplex e nvironments 
where numerous parameters need to monitored and projected into the future by the operator 
because of the inherent capabilities of the SPDS to logically display critical parameters in a more 
salient and clear method. The decision analysis approach utilized in this study showed that by 
presenting the needed information about status in a more salient manner on the SPDS panel the 
often complicated cognitive functions of problem recognition and control tasks could be 
simplified. A dmittedly, t he a uthors o f t he E PRI r eport c all for m ore r esearch i nto t he S PDS 
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prototypes. However, it was not until recently that one of the display types was resurrected for 
further research, this time for an aerospace application. 
2.2 - Mission Status Graphics 
The flight deck of an aircraft is an extremely complex environment - especially during 
busy non-normal situations, similar to the control room in nuclear power plants. Situation 
awareness often suffers as this complexity increases. In an information rich environment, like the 
cockpit of an aircraft, individual details can often become compelling, causing the human to 
overlook other prominent sources of information. In environments such as this, the operators 
need a way to quickly assess the situation when critical information is spread across multiple 
displays (Trujillo & Schutte, 1999). Previous research has shown that automated monitors, like 
the terrain collision avoidance system (TCAS) recently approved by the FAA, can aid humans in 
recognizing and dealing with failures or emergencies (Trujillo, 2002). Polar star displays are an 
ideal candidate for implementation as an automated monitor due to its emergent features 
mentioned earlier. Global failure detection can be effectively supported by these emergent 
features if they clearly carry information about important system states, according to Buttigieg 
and Sanderson (1991). Polar star displays, by design, consist of a polygon where each vertex of 
the polygon represents an abstracted parameter as an emergent feature of the display (Woods, 
Wise, & Hanes, 1981). When all the parameters are in the normal or expected range, the 
polygon i s r egular (i.e. symmetrical) a nd can b e r einforced b y t he a ddition o f a d otted c ircle 
added around the polygon representing the normal operating range. During non-normal 
situations, the parameters deviate from the reference circle either outwardly or inwardly 
respective to the sign of the value of the parameter with regard to the normal or expected value. 
Therefore, an irregular polygon indicates a possible problem (Trujillo & Schutte, 1999). 
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Recently, NASA has resurrected the polar star display for application to the next 
generation of glass cockpit avionics research. Dubbed Mission Status Graphics (MSG), the 
display consists of two polar star graphics, one mission oriented and the other system oriented. 
The mission graphic consists of parameters like altitude, speed, fuel, course, heading, and 
vertical speed. Similarly, the system graphic consists of parameters like hydraulic, electrical, 
avionics, communication, engine, and fuel, systems. The figure below shows hypothetical polar 
star mission status graphics displays (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 - Hypothetical polar star mission status graphics displays 
The manner in which these displays are designed is under some scrutiny. For example, 
Bartolone and Trujillo (2002), conducted a survey of forty-one glass cockpit airline transport 
pilots investigating various aspects of a hypothetical mission status graphics display. The survey 
results indicated that the MSG system display should indicate that a parameter is out of bounds 
by advancing and retreating the vertex according to the respective system/component value in a 
continuously updating (i.e. free-flowing) manner. Pilots prefer to confirm receipt of the 
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information by depressing an "acknowledgement button" on the MSG display screen rather then 
allowing problem resolution to act as acknowledgment. The survey also showed preference for 
the MSG display panel to be the same size as current glass cockpit CRT's and should be ideally 
located in the center of the primary instrument panel for clear viewing from either the pilot or co-
pilot positions. Furthermore, the pilots surveyed felt MSG would be beneficial for observation, 
problem investigation and isolation, and overall that the system would be a valuable item to 
include of future flight decks (Bartolone & Trujillo, 2002). 
After receiving a favorable response to the mission status graphics display from the glass-
cockpit commercial airline pilots surveyed, NASA began a series of controlled experiments 
incorporating the MSG display into a high-fidelity flight simulator. To date, the findings of only 
one experiment have been published. This initial experiment was designed to investigate two 
issues with regards to how the display should move: (1) whether the display movements should 
be continuous or discrete, and (2) if the parameters that make up each vertex should move in one 
direction only (independent of sign) or move in both directions with movement indicative of the 
parameters sign (Trujillo, 2002). The within subject variables for the experiment were the 
movement type and movement direction of the vertices during six experimental trials. 
During each trial, only one parameter would reach an "alert" condition and then it would 
maintain that condition until the subject clicked the stop button indicating that he was ready to 
answer questions about what was just observed. The subjects were then asked to rate, on 
continuous Likert-scales, their responses to five questions about how easy or difficult it was to 
use the MSG display. Furthermore, the subjects were encouraged to use a figure provided to 
them that detailed the parameters that made up each vertex in order to provide a frame of 
reference and enhance realism of the study. Once the subject submitted their answers for the 
first data trial, the next trial would begin. The process was repeated for the remaining trials for 
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the first display and then would begin all over again for the second display, following the within 
subjects experimental design. After all the data runs were complete, the subject was asked to 
answer the NASA-TLX questionnaire so a measure of workload could be established (Trujillo, 
2002). 
In this experiment, several dependent measures were recorded. The amount of time spent 
looking at the display and the amount of time to answer the associated questions were recorded 
by the computer as objective data measures; the computers clock started and stopped each time 
the s ubj ect t ransitioned between s cenario a nd q uestionnaire o r v ice v ersa. The rankings t he 
subjects provided during the display questionnaires, NASA-TLX, and final comprehensive 
questionnaire, were recorded as the subjective dependent measures for the experiment. 
Based on the results of the experiment, Trujillo concluded that relative movement of the 
polar star display is best. Not only did subjects prefer this type of display movement, statistical 
evidence showed that they actually performed better with relative movement direction of the 
polar graphic. Unfortunately, no clear advantage was evident for either continuous or discrete 
movement type. Therefore, Trujillo determined that future NASA Langley experiments 
involving the MSG display would feature a continuous-relative polar-star graphic and will occur 
in a high-fidelity fully programmable flight simulator running a full mission simulation. This 
real world setting would help researchers determine whether or not the MSG display does, in 
fact, aid in monitoring aircraft mission and system health and overall problem detection and 
diagnosis (Trujillo, 2002). Although situation awareness was not addressed with this initial 
NASA research, the fact the subjects in the NASA experiment found the display useful indicates 
that further research in this domain is warranted, hence the need for the research in this thesis. 
Due to mission status graphics concise integration of pertinent information, its strong 
emergent features, and its potential to enhance information processing, it is believed that pilot 
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situation awareness will improve. Although none of the information included in the MSG 
display is new, it represents the next step in cognitively organized display technology designed 
with regard to human factors from the out set. The addition of another display panel to the 
modern flight d eck i s a precarious d ecision. H owever, when t he d isplay h as t he p otential t o 
increase situation awareness and overall have a positive impact the safety of flight, industry 
cannot ignore it. Thus far, Trujillo's research has demonstrated that the MSG displays can be 
useful for integrating complex information in a meaningful manner, but the link to SA hasn't 
been made yet. That is the purpose of this study. Pilots are being overloaded with information 
in an intense and stressful environment. However, the mission status graphics display has the 
ability to improve the delicate relationship between machine and operator as has been shown in 
previous polar star display research and the underpinning of situation awareness outlined 
previously. Furthermore, integrated display technology already in use in corporate and 
commercial aviation cockpits like the next generation of weather displays, terrain avoidance 
displays, navigation displays, and traffic avoidance displays, have already demonstrated that 
automated monitor type systems that group logical data together efficiently can serve to enhance 
situation awareness. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the mission status graphics polar star 
display, with its integrated data display format, will also improve situation awareness. However, 
investigating the application of integrated displays to a general aviation cockpit has thus far not 
been considered; there are many benefits for such an application. 
All pilots must first begin their flight training in general aviation aircraft making this 
environment ideal for the introduction of a display such as mission status graphics. During 
training, keeping your head up and looking outside the aircraft is critical, however, maintaining 
situation awareness is also of equal importance. With the incorporation of a MSG display, pilots 
will be able to acquire, at a glance, the overall mission and system health of the aircraft they are 
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piloting without the time and resource intensive process of data assimilation from a myriad of 
dials, gauges, screens, and displays. 
The proposed study outlined below is expected to uncover improvements in pilot failure 
detection time, situation assessment, and situation awareness. According to Endsley (2000), the 
problem with today's systems is not a lack of information, but finding what is needed when it is 
needed. An ever-widening gap exists between the illogically scattered volumes of data being 
produced by today's avionics and a pilot's ability to find the data that are important. Endsley 
(2000), calls this the "information gap" and labels it as a primary challenge to situation 
awareness. Therefore, it is up to the designers of future systems to provide the operator with the 
needed information and capabilities while insuring that it is provided in a way that is useable 
cognitively as well as physically (Endsley, 2000). 
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3.0-Hypotheses 
3.1 - Failure Detection Time 
Based on the experiment outlined below and the previous research in the domains of 
situation awareness and polar star displays, it is expected that the addition of the mission status 
graphics display will improve performance of pilots with respect to time required for failure 
detection. Although failure detection time specifically has not been measured in previous polar 
star research, Woods, Wise, and Hanes' (1981), investigation of safety parameter display 
systems (SPDS) did show that the crew was able toreturn the nuclear power plant to a safe 
configuration sooner and with fewer parameter excursions using an SPDS display than in 
situations when the SPDS was either not available or not utilized. 
3.2 - Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) will be improved for the instrument panels that include the 
mission status graphics (MSG) polar star display compared to the conventional instrument panels 
as measured by scores on the SART questionnaires administered to each subject at the end of 
each trial. It is important to remember that situation awareness has not yet been measured for 
polar star displays, making this research long overdue. Furthermore, all of the scenarios utilized 
in the experiment are expected to demonstrate situation awareness in the subjects to some degree 
based on the measure of their responses to the post scenario SART questions. 
3.3 - Scenario Type 
Since mission status graphics are designed to integrate critical mission and systems 
parameters onto one display, the evaluation of the display will involve seven mission and seven 
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system scenarios, constituting the two levels of the independent variable "scenario type". 
However, such an application of polar star displays has not yet been researched there is no clear 
evidence to indicate that mission status graphics will be more useful for one type of scenario 
over another. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that there will be no interaction between the two 
independent variables of scenario type and display type. 
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4.0 - Methods 
4.1 - Participants 
As with any credible scientific research, subject selection is critical. For the proposed 
experiment, volunteers from the Embry Riddle Aeronautical University Daytona Beach Campus 
were used. Since the display being evaluated in this experiment was aimed toward application in 
future general aviation cockpits, only Aeronautical Science majors (those training to become 
professional pilots) were considered for subject selection. A total often subjects were used for 
data collection in the pilot study and each possessed a minimum of a FAA Private Pilot License 
with an instrument rating due to the instrument reading tasks required for this experiment. 
Normally, a statistical power analysis would be performed to ensure enough subjects to 
exceed a statistical power of 0.80. However, in this case, the lack of previous research in the 
domain of mission status graphics polar star displays precluded the possibility of performing 
such an estimate. Therefore, an investigative pilot study was performed in order to arrive at an 
estimate of sample size for a follow-up experiment. 
4.2 - Materials and Apparatus 
To perform the experiment, several items needed to be acquired or created. A PC 
running customized software capable of displaying high-resolution picture files of a generic 
general aviation aircraft instrument panel was the primary piece of experimental equipment. In 
addition, fourteen uniquely different scenarios that correspond to realistic in-flight events 
common to general aviation aircraft were scripted. The scripted scenarios were based on similar 
scenarios scripted for a dynamic high fidelity Cessna Citation X flight simulator experiment 
scheduled by NASA Langley for the near future. However, since the research called for a static 
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scan of a generic general aviation (GA) instrument panel, only the failure or event concepts are 
similar between this study and the one planned by NASA. With that said, two slides of the static 
GA " instrument p anel v iew" for each s cenario were created. O ne s lide h ad t he M SG d isplay 
included in the "instrument panel view" (Figure 3), the other had a weather display in place of 
the MSG display (Figure 4). In this case, the weather display served as ambiguous filler for the 
space occupied by the MSG display in the experimental instrument panel, thereby achieving 
balance between the panels. A simple timer within the software measured the subjects' failure 
detection time to each scenario and the time was recorded in a hidden file for analysis. 
Worksheets of the standard 3-D SART questionnaires (Appendix A) and situation accuracy 
questions were created as well, so that situation awareness measures could b e quantified and 
qualified before being included in the data analysis. Finally, a laminated copy of the "all 
conditions normal" instrument panel with the appropriate experimental display were created and 
provided for each subject to refer to while participating in the experiment. 
The generic general aviation instrument panels used in this experiment were all 
composed of the same gauges and instruments with the exception of the MSG display. Each 
gauge or instrument was capable of being set to depict the necessary information appropriate for 
each experimental scenario so that the entire panel would contain the same information as if the 
scenario were a real world situation. The gauges and instruments that made up each panel were 
identical to those found in a pressurized single engine general aviation aircraft with retractable 
landing gear as viewed from the pilot in command position (Figures 3 & 4). 
4.3 - Experimental Design 
A randomized 2 x 2 mixed factorial design was adopted for this experiment. This design 
called for the random assignment of subjects into two experimental groups. Each group was 
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exposed to the appropriate levels of both the display type and scenario type independent 
variables, simultaneously. The control group saw the "instrument panel view" slide for each of 
the fourteen different scenarios (7 mission and 7 system) with the weather display in place of the 
MSG display, as seen in Figure 3. The experimental group was run through the same fourteen 
scenarios (7 mission and 7 system) as the first group with the addition of the MSG display to the 
"instrument panel view" in place of the weather display, as seen in Figure 4. The dependant 
variables for this experiment were the time that elapses between the onset of the scenario and the 
point when the subject acknowledged the detection of the problem (i.e. failure detection time) 
and the subject's perceived situation awareness (3-D SART scales). Scenario type and the 
presence of the MSG display acted as the independent variables as it was unknown whether 
MSG would aid the subjects equally regardless of scenario type or more for mission or systems 
situation awareness. 
The scenarios that were employed for this research constituted an assortment of common 
system failures and mission deviations within the general aviation domain. Prior to entering a 
scenario, the subjects had knowledge of what the status of the aircraft shouldbe. W hen the 
scenario began, it was the subject's job to scan the instrument panel, perceive the data (Level 1 
SA), and comprehend the data (Level 2 SA). Once this had occurred and the subject was 
confident they knew what the scenario depicted, they acknowledged such by clicking stop, the 
scenario was terminated, and the SART questionnaire designed to quantify SA was administered. 
4.4 - Experimental Procedures 
Upon arrival, every subject was greeted and asked to read and sign a consent form. 
Individually, each subject was exposed to the appropriate level of the independent variable based 
on a group assignment by the experimenter. For the pilot study, the subjects were scheduled to 
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sit for the experiment in two groups of five subjects per group. In order to avoid the difficulties 
of group scheduling, the subjects for the follow-up study were allowed to sit for the experiment 
individually when it was convenient for him or her. 
For both experiments, each subject was seated in front of a PC, the software was 
initialized, the subject viewed the first slide, when ready he or she clicked the stop button 
indicating that they knew the state of the aircraft, the slide went black, the failure detection time 
was recorded by the software, and finally the subject responded to the post scenario 3-D SART 
and situation accuracy questionnaire. Each subject's responses to the three metrics of the 3-D 
SART were recorded by the subject drawing a short perpendicular line through the continuous 
100-millimeter scales for each of the three measures: understanding, demand on attentional 
resources, and supply of attentional resources (Appendix A). This data was later translated into 
numerical values in the form of distance from zero in millimeters and input into the accepted 
formula of SA (calc) = Understanding - (Demand - Supply). Finally, the numerical value of SA 
was combined with the accuracy data (accuracy questionnaire) and performance data from the 
experiment (failure detection time) and a composite overview of each subject's situation 
awareness was arrived at for each scenario in each level of the experimental variable. 
Once all the necessary data were collected from a subject, he or she was debriefed, 
thanked, and allowed to go. The elapsed failure detection time and each subject's SART 
responses were coded for statistical analysis. Furthermore, if a subject indicated they knew the 
status of the aircraft, yet gave an incorrect response with regard to status via the post scenario 
accuracy questions, their data was still recorded for analysis. Subject scheduling differed from 
the pilot study to the follow-up study. In the pilot study, the subjects performed the experiment 
in two groups of 5 whereas in the follow-up study each subject was scheduled individually. 
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Figure 3 - "Instrument Panel View" with Mission Status Graphics Display 
Figure 4 - "Instrument Panel View" without Mission Status Graphics Display 
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5.0-Results 
5.1 - Experiment 1 
The data collected during Experiment 1 for failure detection time, SART scores, and 
accuracy, were organized so that the data gained for each subject were grouped by SCENARIO 
TYPE, (the within subjects variable), and by DISPLAY TYPE, (the between subjects variable). 
With respect to SCENARIO TYPE (i.e. mission scenario vs. system scenario), the means for 
failure detection time and SART were calculated for each subject. The means were then entered 
into SPSS's repeated measures analysis component with SCENARIO TYPE as the repeated 
measure. The accuracy questions that followed each scenario were not statistically analyzed. 
This experiment was initially intended to serve as a pilot study in order to estimate an 
appropriate sample size for a subsequent experiment. Ten Embry Riddle Aeronautical 
University students working towards their Aeronautical Science bachelor degrees were recruited 
to serve as subjects for this experiment. The tables (1 & 2) below list the results of a brief 
background questionnaire administered to each volunteer before the experiment. 
Table 1 Experiment 1: Average Age and Flight Experience 
Display Demographic Mean Std. Deviation N 
Age(yrs) 22.6 1.14 
WX 5 
Experience (hrs) 308.00 61.09 
Age (yrs) 22.0 2.00 
MSG 5 
Experience (hrs) 345.00 127.96 
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Table 2 - Experiment 1: Subject Gender and Training Location 
Display 
WX 
MSG 
Male 
5 
5 
Gender 
Female 
0 
0 
Training 
ERAU only 
3 
1 
Location 
ERAU & Non-
ERAU 
2 
4 
Failure detection time was found to be substantially larger in this experiment for those 
subjects whose generic instrument panel did not include the Mission Status Graphics (MSG) 
polar star display; DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 26.85, p<0.001. Furthermore, in the group of 
subjects who saw the generic weather display in place of MSG on their instrument panels, failure 
detection time was larger for system failure or deviation detection than for mission failure or 
deviation detection as evidenced by the statistically significant factor of SCENARIO TYPE, 
F(l,8) = 49.18, pO.OOl. Within the group of subjects who saw the MSG, display failure 
detection time stayed virtually the same across both mission and system scenarios. Essentially, 
those subjects in the MSG display group were, on average, able to detect system failures or 
deviations four times faster then those without MSG. Similarly, mission deviations or failures 
were, on average, detected twice as quickly by those subjects with MSG then those without. 
These unequal variations in detection time are supported by the statistically significant 
interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by SCENARIO TYPE, F(l,8) = 48.59, pO.OOl. Additional 
output from SPSS can be seen in the table of means (Table 3) and the statistical source table 
below (Table 4). 
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Table 3 - Experiment 1: Table of Means for Failure Detection Time 
Failure 
Detection 
Time 
Mission 
Scenarios 
System 
Scenarios 
Table 4 - Experiment 1 
Source df 
Display 
Condition 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
Mean (ms) 
7084.63 
3088.63 
12106.40 
3103.60 
Std. Deviation 
2632.48 
238.36 
3149.13 
342.52 
: Source Table for Failure Detection Time 
SS MS F Eta2 
N 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Observed 
Power 
Display 1 211211002 211211002 26.85** 0.77 0.99 
Error 8 629224927 7865616 
Scenario 1 31710973 31710973 49.17** 0.86 1.00 
Interaction 1 31335058 31335058 48.59** 0.85 1.00 
Error 8 5159496 644937 
Total 19 908641455 282767586 
**(p< 0.001) 
The Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) provided a numerical estimate of 
subjective situation awareness for each scenario viewed by the subjects. In general, the larger 
the value returned for SA the better the subjects' situation awareness. The subject's responses to 
the SART metrics were also analyzed via a repeated measures ANOVA, with SCENARIO TYPE 
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again serving as the repeated measure. A main effect for DISPLAY TYPE was found however, 
there was no effect for SCENARIO TYPE or the interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by SCENARIO 
TYPE. SA was substantially larger for the MSG display group than the weather display group, 
as evidenced by the statistically significant mean differences for the between subjects variable 
DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 126.26, pO.OOl. For both mission and system scenarios, the average 
SA was nearly twice as large for the MSG group as the weather group. Additional statistical data 
for the SART repeated measures ANOVA can be seen in the table of means (Table 5) and the 
statistical source table (Table 6) below. 
Table 5 - Experiment 1: Table of Means for SA Scores 
SA 
Mission 
Scenarios 
System 
Scenarios 
Display Condition 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
Mean 
90.29 
172.54 
87.77 
167.40 
Std. Deviation 
7.92 
17.04 
8.95 
12.13 
N 
5 
5 
5 
5 
The accuracy questions that followed the 3-D SART on the post scenario questionnaires 
were not statistically analyzed due to the fact that nearly ever subject responded correctly to the 
questions for all scenarios presented to them with the exception of the Fuel Low - Left Tank 
mission scenario. Three subjects in the weather display group incorrectly indicated that "Fuel 
Low-Left Tank" scenario was a system failure or deviation. Excluding these incorrect responses, 
every subject was able to classify and identify the failure or deviation seen in each scenario 
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thereby lending support to the subjective SART metrics by insuring that each SA score computed 
was based on confirmed knowledge of the scenario depicted. 
Table 6 - Experiment 1: Source Table for SA Scores 
Source df SS MS Eta2 Observed Power 
Display 32759 32759 126.26** 0.94 1.00 
Error 2076 259 
Scenario 73 73 2.38 0.23 0.28 
Interaction 1 0.28 0.03 0.08 
Error 246 31 
Total 19 35162 33131 
**(p< 0.001) 
Table 7 - Experiment 1: Estimates of Effect Size 
Measure Display Mean Std. Dev. Cohen's d Effect Size 
Failure Detection 
Time (ms) 
WX 
MSG 
9595.51 
3096.11 
6194.24 
618.37 
1.48 0.59 
Situation 
Awareness 
WX 
MSG 
89.03 
169.97 
8.80 
21.13 
5.00 0.93 
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For Experiment 1, estimates of effect size were calculated using Cohen's descriptive 
method. The values for Cohen's d for Experiment 1 can be seen in Table 7 above. The results 
indicated that 59% of the variability in the failure detection time variable was explained by the 
difference in the display type viewed by the subjects in the experiment. In addition, 93% of the 
variability in situation awareness variable could be accounted for by the difference in the display 
type viewed by the subjects during the experiment. 
5.2 - Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted as a follow-up experiment to Experiment 1. Based on the 
observations of strong main effects of DISPLAY TYPE for both failure detection time and SA 
shown by the SPSS output for Experiment 1, the experimental design was not altered. Ten 
different ERAU Aeronautical Science student volunteers served as subjects for the second 
experiment. The data collected during Experiment 2 for failure detection time, SART scores, 
and accuracy, were again organized by SCENARIO TYPE, (the within subjects variable), and 
DISPLAY TYPE, (the between subjects variable). With respect to SCENARIO TYPE (i.e. 
mission scenario vs. system scenario), the means for failure detection time and SART were 
calculated for each subject. The means were then input into SPSS's repeated measures analysis 
component with SCENARIO TYPE as the repeated measure. Once again, the accuracy 
questions that followed each scenario were not statistically analyzed. The tables (8 & 9) below 
list the responses to the background questionnaire administered to each subject prior to the 
experiment. 
Average failure detection time was again more rapid for those subjects in the MSG group 
than the weather group. For both mission and system scenarios the MSG group detected the 
failure or deviation three times quicker than those without the benefit of the MSG display. This 
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Table 8 Experiment 2: Average Age and Flight Experience 
Display Demographic Mean Std. Deviation N 
Age(yrs) 21.20 1.64 
WX 5 
Experience (hrs) 282.00 43.24 
Age(yrs) 23.60 5.81 
MSG 5 
Experience (hrs) 282.00 99.12 
Table 9 - Experiment 2: 
Display 
WX 
MSG 
Gender and Training Location 
Gender 
Male Female 
5 0 
4 1 
Training 
ERAU only 
2 
3 
Location 
ERAU&Non-
ERAU 
3 
2 
observation is supported by the significant mean differences for the between subjects factor 
DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 28.00, p<0.001. However, unlike the first experiment, there was no 
statistical significance for SCENARIO TYPE nor for the interaction between SCENARIO TYPE 
and DISPLAY TYPE. Table 10 below lists the computed means and Table 11 is the statistical 
source table for the failure detection time data collected during Experiment 2. 
Average SA computed from the subjective SART questionnaires for Experiment 2 
repeated the results found in Experiment 1. Again, a main effect for DISPLAY TYPE was found 
however, there was no effect for SCENARIO TYPE or the interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by 
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Table 10 - Experiment 2: Table of Means for Failure Detection Time 
Failure 
Detection Display Mean (ms) Std. Deviation N 
Time 
Mission 
Scenarios 
System 
Scenarios 
condition 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
11439.97 
3874.91 
12019.51 
3830.63 
3333.20 
1184.54 
3909.77 
1001.56 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Table 11 - Experiment 2: Source Table for Failure Detection Time 
Source df SS MS Eta^ Observed Power 
Display 
Error 
310233394 
88638855 
310233394 28.00** 0.78 
11079857 
0.99 
Scenario 358125 358125 0.11 0.01 0.06 
Interaction 1 486457 486453 0.15 0.02 0.06 
Error 26572325 3321541 
Total 19 426289152 325479370 
**(p< 0.001) 
SCENARIO TYPE. The MSG display group again had average SA scores that were nearly 
twice the average of those in the weather display group, regardless of the type of scenario. This 
observation is supported by the statistically significant mean differences seen for the between 
subjects factor DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 16.91, p<0.003. However, like Experiment 1, average 
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SA did not fluctuate across SCENARIO TYPE for either the weather display or MSG display 
groups, w hich e xplains w hy S CENARIO T YPE a nd t he i nteraction o f S CENARIO T YPE b y 
DISPLAY TYPE were not found to be statistically significant for Experiment 2. Table 11 is an 
overview of the sample means and Table 12 is the statistical source table for the SART for 
Experiment 2. 
Table 12 - Experiment 2: Table of Means for SA Scores 
SA 
Mission 
Scenarios 
System 
Scenarios 
Display 
Condition 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
WX Display 
MSG Display 
Mean 
81.26 
153.03 
76.54 
142.40 
Std. Deviation 
37.93 
23.56 
19.26 
32.22 
N 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Unlike Experiment 1, the accuracy questions did not show any indication of the "low 
fuel" classification confusion evident in the first experiment for the weather display group. 
Every subject that participated in Experiment 2 correctly classified and identified each scenario. 
Therefore, a statistical analysis of the accuracy questions was not performed 
As in Experiment 1, estimates of effect size were calculated using Cohen's descriptive 
method. The values for Cohen's d for Experiment 2 can be seen in Table 14 below. The results 
indicated that 61% of the variability in the failure detection time variable are explained by the 
difference in the display type viewed by the subjects in the experiment. In addition, 69% of the 
variability in situation awareness variable can be accounted for by the difference in the display 
type viewed by the subjects during the experiment. 
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Table 13 - Experiment 2: Source Table for SA Scores 
Source df SS MS Eta2 Observed Power 
Display 
Error 
Scenario 
Interaction 
Error 
1 
8 
1 
1 
8 
23677 
2076 
294 
44 
2412 
23677 
259 
294 
44 
301 
16.91* 0.68 0.95 
0.98 
0.15 
0.11 
0.02 
0.14 
0.06 
Total 19 28502 24576 
*(p<0.01) 
Table 14 - Experiment 2: Estimates of Effect Size 
Measure Display Mean Std. Dev. Cohen's d Effect Size 
Failure Detection 
Time (ms) 
WX 
MSG 
11729.74 7061.99 
3852.77 1655.10 
1.54 0.61 
Situation 
Awareness 
WX 
MSG 
78.90 
147.71 
38.33 
34.01 
1.90 0.69 
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6.0 - Discussion 
6.1 - Experiment 1 
The robust results detected by this experiment support the hypotheses put forth earlier in 
this research. The MSG display clearly sped up failure detection time, and subjective situation 
awareness s cores d oubled w hen t he M SG d isplay was p resent. T he e mergent features o f t he 
polar star design, the logical groupings of pertinent system and mission parameters, and the 
simplicity of the uncluttered display layout have fulfilled the claims of fostering a more rapid 
perception of cues in the environment. Average failure detection time was dramatically lower 
for t he M SG g roup then the w eather d isplay group; h owever, an i nteraction w as found t o b e 
present that was not expected between the within subjects variable of SCENARIO TYPE and the 
between subjects variable of DISPLAY TYPE. Subjects in the weather display group had 
substantially lower failure detection times for mission scenarios then system scenarios. This 
trend was not evident in the MSG group. This is possibly due to the fact that the gauges and 
instruments such as the altimeter, heading indicator, and airspeed indicator, used to depict 
mission deviations or failures are fairly universal in the general aviation domain. Conversely, 
the hydraulic pressure indicator, oil temperature gauge, and fuel gauges, used to depict system 
failures or deviations can and often do change from aircraft to aircraft. Therefore, one possible 
explanation for the effect of SCENARIO TYPE found in this study is that the subject's 
unfamiliarity with the system gauges used in this experiment was likely a factor in how quickly 
pertinent information was absorbed from these gauges and instruments. Regardless, MSG has 
clearly demonstrated that it can fill the role of an automated monitor while serving to reduce the 
amount of time required for pertinent information to be transferred from source to human 
processor. 
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Quicker detection of a failure or deviation by using MSG was only one of the hypotheses 
intended to be tested by this research. The other primary hypothesis was that the subjects would 
have a more complete and accurate view of the "big picture", otherwise known as higher 
situation awareness. This experiment took an initial step in investigating the impact that MSG 
displays have on situation awareness. Trujillo (2002), concluded that her research, thus far, has 
demonstrated that the MSG displays can be useful for integrating complex information in a 
meaningful manner but never made the connection to situation awareness. The subjective SA 
scores computed from the data collected in this experiment, on average, were twice as large 
when the MSG display was present than when it was replaced by the weather radar display. 
Endsley's (2000) "information gap" between the illogically scattered volumes of data being 
displayed and a pilot's ability to find the data that are important, proclaimed to be the primary 
challenge to situation awareness, seems to shrink dramatically with MSG based on the 
comparison of the SA scores between the two display groups. The accuracy questions that 
followed each subjective SART questionnaire served to confirm that the subjective SART scores 
were indeed based on an accurate internalized view of the current state of the aircraft. The fact 
that every subject in the MSG display condition was able to correctly classify and specifically 
identify every deviation or failure they saw, consistently, provides strong credibility to the claim 
that MSG truly did serve to enhance situation awareness in those subjects belonging to the MSG 
display group. 
Figure 5 consists of two plots of means from the data gathered in Experiment 1. The 
unexpected interaction of SCENARIO TYPE by DISPLAY TYPE can be seen in the upward 
sloping line for the weather display condition in the plot labeled Average Failure Detection Time 
- Experiment 1. The parallel sloping lines seen in the SA data plot for Experiment 1 are 
evidence of the lack of a statistically significant interaction between SCENARIO TYPE and 
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DISPLAY TYPE. The lack of an interaction, in this case, was not alarming. The type of 
scenario was hypothesized to not have an impact on the subjective value of SA that would be 
reported by the subjects. A second experiment was conducted to test whether the results of 
Experiment 1 could be repeated, thereby adding support to this research, overall. 
6.2 - Experiment 2 
The second experiment was essentially a repeat of the first. Due to the significant results 
of the first experiment and the observed power indicated by SPSS, the number of subjects was 
held at ten. Average failure detection time was again much more rapid for those subjects in the 
MSG group than in the weather group. For both mission and system scenarios the MSG group 
detected the failure or deviation three times quicker than those without the benefit of the MSG 
display. However, unlike the first experiment, there was no interaction between the SCENARIO 
TYPE and DISPLAY TYPE and subsequently, SCENARIO TYPE alone also did not show an 
effect. The lack of interaction in the second experiment is not alarming and may simply have 
been a chance occurrence observed in the first experiment. Since interaction in Experiment 1 
occurred solely within the weather display condition group, it would be only mildly worth 
watching for in future MSG experimental research. Furthermore, the interaction, or lack thereof, 
may possibly be explained by the difference in strategy employed by the subjects in the different 
experiments. In Experiment 2, the subjects may have been attempting to provide their best 
possible effort thereby cautiously scanning the panel with a more consistent investment of time 
then those subjects in Experiment 1 whose familiarity with the gauges used to depict mission 
failures or deviations made them more comfortable stopping the scenario sooner. The lack of the 
aforementioned interaction can be easily seen in the parallel sloping lines for both the weather 
display condition and the MSG display condition in the plot labeled Average Failure Detection 
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Time - Experiment 2 (Figure 6). In Experiment 2, failure detection time again supported the 
hypothesis that the MSG display group would have lower Failure Detection times than the 
weather display group. The confirmation of this main effect, received by conducting this follow-
up experiment, shows that the Mission Status Graphics display is reducing the amount of time 
required for pilots to scan the available instruments by drawing their eye to the MSG display 
which in turn tells the pilot where to focus his attention. The color changing vertices, the relative 
movement of the parameters, and the presence of the reference circle, come to together to serve 
as emergent features that have the ability to facilitate pre-attentive visual processing, thereby 
substantially shortening the time required to perceive critical information. 
The average SA computed from the subjective SART questionnaires for Experiment 2 
repeated the results found in Experiment 1, as well. The MSG display group again had average 
SA scores nearly twice the average of those in the weather display group, regardless of the type 
of scenario. Furthermore, a review of the accuracy questions did not show any indication of the 
"low fuel" classification confusion evident in the first experiment for the weather display group. 
Every subject that participated in Experiment 2 correctly classified and identified each scenario 
shown to them, thereby further strengthening confidence in the subjective SART data collected. 
The variability inherent in any subjective measure requires that a measure of caution be used 
when drawing conclusions from data of this type. However, the average computed SART scores 
for both experiments can be reasonably trusted to be true after confirming that all subjects, 
regardless of SCENARIO TYPE or display group, correctly identified every deviation or failure. 
Again, MSG has clearly lived up to its theorized potential by demonstrating repeatable results for 
nearly doubling the average situation awareness scores reported by the MSG display group when 
compared to the weather display group. This statistically significant main effect is not surprising 
given the fact that both the research by Woods, Wise, and Hanes (1981) and Bartolone and 
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Trujillo (2002) have both stated that the benefits of displaying information in the polar star 
display format h ave s ubstantial p otential. T hat potential h as b een t ested i n t his r esearch a nd 
statistically confirmed. 
6.3 - General Discussion and Conclusions 
In light of the results of both experiments it can reasonably be stated that the presence of 
the Mission Status Graphics polar star display facilitates a more rapid detection of failures or 
deviations than when only the traditional instrumentation is used. Furthermore, the consistently 
sharp difference in the subjective SART scores between the weather and MSG display conditions 
indicates that, at the very least, the subjects who were exposed to the MSG display felt it 
markedly improved their situation awareness. Additionally, the large effects estimated by the 
Cohen's d calculations performed on the data bolster confidence in these statements. 
With the MSG display, average failure detection time was decreased by at least one half 
in Experiment 1 and by two-thirds in Experiment 2, when compared to the weather display. 
Average subjective SA scores were approximately twice as high with the presence of the MSG 
display in both experiments, indicating a higher perceived level of situation awareness. 
However, subjective measurement of situation awareness can be inconsistent and difficult to 
verify but the presence of the accuracy questions in this research raises confidence in the 
conclusions drawn from the SA data. Caution in how these conclusions should be interpreted is 
still warranted due to the known limitations of SART and its close resemblance to workload 
measurement techniques. However, the observed statistical power was large for both 
experiments and the effect of the presence of the MSG display yielded significant statistical 
results for Experiment 2, just as it had in Experiment 1, showing that this experimental design is 
capable of replication. The lack of a significant interaction between SCENARIO TYPE and 
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DISPLAY TYPE in Experiment 2 and the subsequent missing significance for SCENARIO 
TYPE alone, may have been influenced by a difference in the strategy employed by the different 
subjects in each experiment. 
The fact that the results from this pair of experiments were significant and in support of 
the hypotheses warrants further research into the capabilities of the MSG display within the 
general aviation domain. At the time when this research was concluded, NASA Langley 
Research Center continued to pursue MSG as an active research program for commercial 
aviation application. The demonstrated capabilities of the Mission Status Graphics display to 
serve as a one-glance automated monitor that is capable of rapid and accurate information 
transfer to the human operators who traditionally have poor performance monitoring reliable 
systems over time is very encouraging. Such a display has potential for application not only in 
aviation but possibly in other domains where human operators are forced to act as monitors in 
information rich environments like the control rooms of nuclear power plants, air traffic control 
facilities, or within the healthcare industry. This two decade old display methodology has the 
potential to save lives and therefore should be further researched so that all its capabilities can be 
identified and subsequently utilized to their fullest potential. Since all pilots must first begin 
their flight training in general aviation aircraft, this would be the ideal environment for the 
introduction of a display such as MSG. With the incorporation of a MSG display, pilots will be 
able to acquire, in one glance, the overall mission and system health of the aircraft they are 
piloting without the time and resource intensive process of data assimilation from a myriad of 
dials, gauges, screens, and displays. 
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Appendix A: Situation Awareness and Accuracy Questionnaire 
Demand on Attentional Resources 
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects your combined opinion of the instability, 
complexity, and variability of the situation you were just presented with. 
Low High 
Supply of Attentional Resources 
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects your degree of arousal, your level of 
concentration, and the amount of space attentional capacity leftover, that you experienced while 
performing the panel scan you just completed. 
Low High 
Understanding of the Situation 
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects the amount of information you received and 
understood, as well as, the overall value of the information you gained by performing the scan of 
the instrument panel you just completed. 
Low High 
How would you classify the situation depicted by the instrument panel you just viewed? 
(choose one) 
Mission [ | System | | No deviation or 
Deviation/Failure Deviation/Failure failure was depicted 
In your own words, what specific deviation or failure was depicted on the instrument panel 
you just viewed? (Example: Electrical Failure) 
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Scenario 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Failure/Deviation 
Hydraulic Pressure 
- Low 
Airspeed - High 
Altitude - High 
Oil Temp - High 
Engine Failure -
Zero RPM 
Airspeed - Low 
COM 1/NAV 1 
Failure 
Fuel Low- Left 
Tank 
Gear - Right Main 
Stuck 
Heading 
Alternator Failure 
Vertical Speed -
Ascent 
Oil Pressure - Low 
Altitude - Low 
Critical Conventional 
Gauge/Instrument 
Hydraulic Press Gauge 
Airspeed Indicator 
Altimeter 
Engine Oil Gauges - Temp 
Engine RPM Gauge 
Airspeed Indicator 
COM1/NAV1 
Fuel Gauge - Left 
Landing Gear Indicator 
Light 
Directional Compass 
Amp Meter 
Vertical Speed Indicator 
Engine Oil Gauges -
Pressure 
Altimeter 
Initial Reference 
Value 
28psi 
120 KTS 
12,000 ft 
80 deg C 
2100 rpm 
120 KTS 
On - Normal 
3/4 L & R tanks 
Gear up and 
locked 
270 deg (due 
West) 
+40 amps 
Ofpm 
110 psi 
12,000 ft 
Indicated 
Scenario Value 
20 psi 
160 kts 
15,000 ft 
130 deg C 
0 rpm 
60 kts 
Off 
0 L & 3/4 R 
R Main 
295 deg 
-40 amps 
1200 fpm 
6o psi 
8,000 ft 
MSG 
Parameter 
HYDR 
IAS 
ALT 
OILT 
ENGN 
IAS 
AVNC 
FUEL 
GEAR 
HDG 
ELEC 
VS 
OILP 
ALT 
